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Abstract 
Tritium handling implies tritium bearing waste streams. Partofthis tritium is re-
covered in appropriate processing steps. An accountancy system is investigated 
for use in such a process. ln particular, the chances of a safe and timely detection 
of anomalies are evaluated in quantitative terms. 
Tritiumbilanzierung unter Beachtung typischer Betriebsabläufe 
Zusammenfassung 
Tritiumführende Systeme werden tritiumkontaminierte Abfallströme erzeugen; 
dieses Tritium kann über geeignete Prozeßschritte wiedergewonnen werden. Für 
eine solche Prozeßführung wird ein Bilanzierungssystem untersucht. Insbe-
sondere werden Möglichkeiten einer sicheren und rechtzeitigen Aufdeckung von 
Anomalien in quantitativer Form ausgewertet. 
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1. lntroduction 
Future nudear fusion power plants which make use of the DT-reaction will require the 
nuclear fuel cycle tobe complete. Careful tritium inventory taking will be necessary not 
only to cope with the issues of radiation protection, but to assist in the management of 
the nuclear fuel cycle as weil. Obviously, inventory taking can be considered only as a 
further measure supplementing the already envisaged systems of containment and 
surveillance. 
At present, only a few stations in the nuclear fuel cycle are being subjected to a more 
in-depth investigation. Above all on account of the physical and chemical properties of 
tritium, laboratories must be adequately equipped so that the investigations can be 
carried out. A laboratory of this type starts its operation on the premises of the 
Karlsruhe Nudear Research Center (KfK}. Thus, the study will benefit from an in situ 
test bed available. Although the investigation described here has been devised for the 
test bed at KfK, the methods supplied can be transferred to other laboratories, too. To 
guarantee this, simulation techniques are used. Normally, three simulation packages 
are necessary in this type of investigation, namely modeling of the underlying process, 
modeling of the measurements applied, and modeling of the accountancy system. This 
investigation deals with the third package. Information concerning the first two pack-
ages indicated iscontained in references [1] and [2]. 
lt should be underlined again in this context that the major task of inventory taking 
consists in the timely detection of any tritium anomaly and, if possible, in locating it. 
Similar criteria have been investigated forarather long time and at great expenditure 
in the nuclear fission fuel cycle. Whereas in nuclear safeguards Iosses and thefts cannot 
be a priori excluded, we are presently not assuming a diversion for non-peaceful pur-
poses in tritium bearing systems. However, it should be emphasized here that the high-
est court in Germany has decided to the effect that in Germany tritium shall be classi-
fied as a basically weapons grade material. 
The simplified experimental setup is represented schematically in Figure 1. Here, P de-
notes a process in which wastes contaminated with tritium are produced. ln the area 
of P measuring points are provided which allow- according to the state of the art- in-
ventory taking tobe made in an optimum manner. The waste streams are collected in 
tank B; their tritium content can be estimated rather inaccurately only. After a quite 
long period of time, the contents of tank B are returned into the process area of P 
where they are deaned and are then available again for a relatively accurate inventory 
tobe taken. 
Fig. 1: 
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efp 
Tritium bearing process P for waste streams contaminated with tritium (the 
Material Balance Area under consideration is marked by a dashed box). 
Thus, the problems associated with balancing accountancy concerning the Material 
Balance Area defined by the process P can be represented in qualitative terms as fol-
lows: At time t 0 the inventory 10 is measured in the process; the tankBis empty. After a 
rather long period [to, tnl the inventory IPn present in process P is measured and the 
tank B is again empty. Du ring the time intervals [tj-1,ti], j = 1 ... , n-1 the "small tritium 
amounts" APj.1, i are discharged from the process into the tank and estimated. More-
over, at the times t1 until tn-1 the process inventories IPj, j = 1, ... n-1 can be measured. 
During the period [tn-1· tn] the "large amount" EPn-1,n is discharged from the tank into 
the process. Let the variances associated with the random measurement errors of all in-
ventories introduced so far be: 
var(Ii)=oi,var(Af_ 1 ,j)=o~ forj=O, ... ,n-1 and var(E~_ 1 ,n)=o~. (1) 
We assume that an inspecting authority will check the balance regularly at time tn and 
that, in addition, it will select at random within the reference period [to, tn1 one of the 
pointsintime tj, j = 1, ... , n-1 and check the balanceforthat period [to, tj]. The idea in-
herent in this approachisthat at the end of the reference period- e.g. at the end of the 
year- a relatively accurate balance can be made up, i.e. any anomalies can be detected 
with a high probability. The interim balance selected at random can then serve for a 
timely detection of anomalies. 
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2. Material Balance Test for the Reference Period [to, tn] 
We define for the period [to, tn1 the balance statistics XPo, n as follows: 
xP = 1P- 1P. O~n 0 n (2) 
lf there were no measuring errors and anomalies, XPoln should equal zero; should the 
anomaly Jl >0 occur, we should find XPoln equals p. However, as measuring errors can-
not be avoided, a statistical test must be performed which will help decide whether a 
non-vanishing value of XPoln can be explained or not solely by measuring errors. 
Under the null hypothesis Ho, we assume that the expected value of XPol n equals zero; 
under the alternative hypothesis H1, we assume the expected value of XPoln tobe posi-
tive: 
H : E (XP ) = 0 
0 0 01 n 
(3) 
H : E (X P ) = 1J > 0 . 
1 1 01 n 
ln order to be able to make the choice between these two hypotheses, the significance 
threshold Sn is defined. The inspector rejects Ho, if the observed value XPoln of XPoln 
exceeds the threshold sn: 
X0P > s : H is rejected. 1 n n 0 (4) 
The value of Sn can be calculated if the probability of error of the first kind On (also 
called false alarm probability) is given; it is defined as the probability that XPoln 
exceeds Sn if in fact the null hypothesis Ho is true: 
a : = prob (X0P > s I H 0 ). n 1 n n (5) 
For the special case of Gaussian or normally distributed measurement errors, the 
following explicit relation between On, Sn and a holds: 
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(6) 
where o2 denotes the variance of XPo,n: 
o2 = var (X 0P ) = var Uo) + var Un) = 2 o: I ,n (7) 
and where 4> (-) represents the Gaussian distribution: 
4> (x) = -- j exp - - dt . 1 X ( t 2 ) ~ -00 2 (8) 
The efficiency of the test procedure is described by the probability of error of the 
second kind ßn (also called no-detection probability}. lt is defined as the probability 
that XPo,n does not exceed Sn if in fact the alternative hypothesis H1 is true: 
ß : = prob (X0P < s I H 1 } • n ,n n (9) 
For our case of normally distributed measurement errorsl we get 
( ~-Sn ) 1 - ßn = 4> - 0 - . {10) 
Using (6} we can eliminate Sn and get 
1 - ßn = 4> ( 11 - Q>-1 ( 1 - an) ) 1 
0 1'{2 
( 11) 
where Q>-1 (·} denotes the inverse function of 4> (·). 
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ln the followingl we call 1-ßn the accountancy effectiveness since we use this quantity 
as the yardstick for the quality of the accountancy system. lt increases monotonically 
with increasing loss }1 1 and increasing probability of error first kindl as weil as with 
decreasing variance o21 as we would expect. 
3. Material Balance Test for Time lntervals [to, tj] within the Reference 
Period [to, tnl 
We now assume thatl in addition to the test for the material balance for the whole 
reference period [to~ tnL the inspector wishes to check the balance at any pointintime 
ti1 j = 1 I ... 1 n-1 I for the period [to~ tj] in order to detect an eventual anomaly earlier than 
only at time tn. Thusl the related balance statistics read: 
p p ~ p p 
X0 . =I 0 - ~ A. 1 . - I. , ,J . 1 1- I I I 
I= 
i= 1, ... , n -1 . (12) 
For the period [to~ tn] there are two possibilities for establishing the material balance 
test statistics: lf we remember that during [tn-11 tn1 the large amount EPn-1, n is dis-
charged from the tank into the process then it is given by 
n-1 
IP- "'"" AP EP IP L...; '1'+ 1 - . o i = 1 1- , 1 n- , n n 
(13) 
On the other handl we assume - under Ho - that all material discharged from the 
process du ring [to~ tn-11 is given back to the process du ring [tn-11 tn]. This means that we 
should have at tn the same process inventory as at to 1) and thus the material balance 
test statistics is given by 
(14) 
ln factl we used this already according to (2), since its variance is smaller than the 
former one. 
1) We assume that all inventory data are corrected for radioactive decay. 
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Specifying the two hypotheses Ho and H1 by 
H : 
0 
H : 
1 
p E (X0 . ) = 0 0 , J 
p 
E (X0 . ) = p. > 0 1 , J .l 
(15) 
(16) 
and the significance Ieveis Sj1 we obtain relations corresponding to Eqs. (6)1 (7) and (11)1 
in particular 
1 - a. = 4> ( l) I J 0. 
J 
(17) 
where Oj2 is given by 
2 2 . 2 
a 1 + jOA for j= 11 ... 1 n-1 
0~ = (18) 
J 2 2 o 1 for j =n~ 
and furthermore 
1 - ß. = <P (~- <l> - 1 (1- a.)) 1 
J 0 J j 
j = 1 I ... 1 n. (19) 
At this point of the process the false alarm probabilities Oj for the test performed at the 
time tj1 j = 1 I ... 1 n-1 I which is selected at randoml and an for the test which takes place 
at any rate at time tn must be fixed. For reasons of pragmatism we set Oj = a for j = 1 I ... 1 
nl but would like to mention that both test procedures arenot independent because of 
the commonly used measurements lo and APi-1, i for i = 1 ... 1 j and therefore the total 
false alarm probability Otot for both tests is given by 
1 - a tot = B ( <P -1 ( 1 - a) I <P -1 ( 1 - a); p i ) I (20) 
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where the correlation Pi between XPo,i and XPo,n is given by 
p, = 
J 
- 1/2 
and where B (h, k; p) is the bivariate standardnormal distribution: 
(21) 
B(h,k;p)= 6 t dt 1 { dt2 exp(-~-1-(t~-2pt 1 t 2 +t~)). (22) 1 - p 2 . - 00 - 00 2 1-p 2 
Evidently, the procedure adopted may also consist in defining in advance Otot· Should 
ai and an be selected to be identical for the individual tests, they are defined by Eq. 
(20). However, they may be selected also to be different from each other in case the 
inspector deems more important one or the other test information. 
lt should be added that for 4+2i o2Afo21 > >1, using Eq. (19), Pi = 0 follows and, 
hence, in general terms, using Eq. (20) and Eq. (22) 
1 - a = (1 - a) 2 · 
tot ' 
moreover, it follows with j · o2Afo21 > > 1 from Eq. (21) that p=f, actually inde-
pendent of j. 
4. Timely Detection of Anomalies 
As the interimbalancecheck by the inspector serves the timely detection of anomalies, 
as has already been mentioned, it suggests itself to ask which time will elapse between 
the occurrence of the anomaly and its detection. ln the following studies the assumed 
anomaly will be solarge that it will be detected with certainty in the test performed at 
time tn. 
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Two cases are investigated, namely 
an anomaly gradually developing from the beginning of the reference period 
(protracted anomaly); 
• a unique anomaly occurring at time tjo (abrupt anomaly). 
4.1 Protracted Anomaly 
lf the interim balance is checked at time tj, the (conditional) expected time until 
detection (expressed by the number of periods for which inventories have been taken) 
isj · (1- ßj)+n · ßi· 
Should the interim balance for any point in time be established with the same 
probability 1 /(n-1 ), the (unconditional) expected time until detection is 
n-1 1 n-1 · n n-J 
E1 (T) = I: [ j · (1- ßi) + n · ßi ] ·-=- + I) - · ßi. 
· 1 n-1 2 . 1 n-1 J- J= 
(23) 
With a uniform distribution of the anomaly Pi= p/n for j = 1, ... , n, the probability ßi of 
no detection is 
«<>-1 (1 - a) - j_ · -;===P== 
n / 2 2 V 2 ol +ja A 
j = 1, ... , n- 1 .. (24) 
Two special cases of (23) are of interest, since they illustrate this formula and are a 
valuable check for numerical calculations. For p = 0 we get from (19) ßi = 1-a for j = 1, ... , 
n and therefore from (23) 
n 1-a n-1 ( a) E (t) = - + - I: (n-j) = n 1 - - ; 
o 2 n-1 . 1 2 J= 
(25) 
this is the expected time until the occurrence of an error first kind (false alarm). 
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For 11 > > Oj, j = 1, ... , n, we get from (19) ßi = 0 and therefore from (23) 
if the inspection authority detects the anomaly with certainty if he checks the balance, 
and if all points t1, ... , tn-1 are chosen with equal probability, then the expected 
detection time is just in the middle of the interval [t1, tn-11. 
4.2 Abrupt Anomaly 
ln this case we deem the time until detection tobe the interval from the pointintime 
tjo of occurrence of the anomaly until its detection. Thus, we obtain instead of Eq. (23) 
E 1 (T; jO) = 
~ [ (j-jO) (1-ß .) + (n-jO) · ß.]-1 L..J 1 1 n 1 forO_< J'O < n-2; j=jO+ 1 -
1 for jO=n-1 
or after some transformations 
(n-jO) (n-j0-1) + ~ n-j ß. for 0 ..::;_ jO .:::;_ n-2 
2(n-1) i=i0+1 n-1 J 
E 1 (T; jO) = (26) 
1 for jO= n-1; 
where, in case of an anomaly 11 occurring at jO, 
for j > jO. (27) 
- 10-
Aga in we consider the same special cases as before. 
For 11 = 0 we get ßi = 1-a, j = 1 I ···1 n-1 I and therefore from (26) 
(n-jO) (n-j0-1) 1-a ~ ( ') E (T; jO) = + - LJ n-J 
o 2 (n-1) n-1 i=iO + 1 
(n-jO) (n-j0-1) 1-a (n-jO) (n-j0-1) 
= +------2 (n-1) n-1 2 
(n-jO) (n-j0-1) ( a) f 0 . = 1 - - or < JO < n-2 (n-1) 2 - - I 
which again is the expected time until the occurrence of an error first kind (false 
alarm). 
For 11 > > Oj for j = 1 I ... 1 n we get from (19) ßr:~,; 0 for j .2:. jO and therefore from (23) 
E (T· '0) = (n-jO) (n-j0- 1) for 0 < ·o < n-2 . 
1 I J 2 (n-1) - J -
5. Numerical Results and Conclusions 
Some results of numerical calculations will be presented below; the input data were 
chosen according to the present knowledge of the operational strategies and 
according to the state of the art. Based on these input data were obtained in 
o21 =0.0001 [g2 H3), o2A =0.002 [g2 H3]; furthermorel the reference time is one year 
including 10 inventory periods. 
Fig. 2: 
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Accountancy effectiveness according to (19) for Oj=a=O.OS, ~j=~/10, j=1, 
... 9, as function of time (expressed as inventory periods) and extent of pre-
sumed anomaly. 
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Accountancy effeciveness according to (19) as function of time (expressed as 
inventory periods) with variance o2A of waste measurements as parameter. 
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Expected detection time as a function of the extent of the presumed ano-
maly with a=O.OS; (I) is the protracted case according to (23); (II) through 
(V) are the abrupt cases according to (26) for jO = 2, 4, 6, and 8, respectively. 
The accountancy effectiveness as presented in Figures 2, 3 and 4 may be interpreted as 
providing the most complete information available to the operator about all material 
balances in the reference time interval. 
Figure 2 shows that with increasing anomaly the accountancy effectiveness improves 
and furthermore that after the material has been collected again in the main 
accountancy area of the process at the end of the reference period, the accountancy 
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effectiveness also sharply improves. Figure 3 shows the influence of the false alarm 
probability a; the wide range of the accountancy effectiveness indicates that both the 
inspector and the operator should carefully consider their purposes for accounting 
before they select the value of the false alarm probability. Finally, Figure 4 demon-
strates the effect of the variance a2A of the waste measurement on the accountancy 
effectiveness; looking at cost benefit considerations this should be known if improve-
ments of the measurement equipment are envisaged. 
The expected detection time as given in Figure 5 is of interest exclusively to the in-
spection authority. ln fact, as mentioned before the random inspection between to and 
tn serves the only purpose of shortening the detection time for the inspector. Figure 3 
also shows that the protracted case may be considered to be the most pessimistic 
assumption. The abrupt case implies a shorter detection time, the later the anomaly 
occurs: Even though the chances of inspection during jO and tn get smaller with 
increasing jO so that the expected detection time gets longer, the time between the 
occurrence of the anomaloy and its safe detection at tn gets shorter and thus, con-
sequently, reduces the expected detection time. 
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